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Abstract 
 
This study utilizes a macro-based VAR framework to investigate whether stock portfolios formed 
on the basis of their value, size and past performance characteristics are affected in a differential 
manner by unexpected US monetary policy actions during the period 1967-2007. Full sample 
results show that value, small capitalization and past loser stocks are more exposed to monetary 
policy shocks in comparison to growth, big capitalization and past winner stocks. Subsample 
analysis, motivated by variation in the realized premia and parameter instability, reveals that 
monetary policy shocks’ impact on these portfolios is significant and pronounced only during the 
pre-1983 period. 
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1. Introduction 
Market participants and the financial press assign a large weight to the role of monetary 
policy decisions for explaining movements in stock prices. Financial analysts and economists 
closely follow the statements of central banks’ board members, while the minutes of monetary 
policy committees’ meetings are scrutinized for signs indicating future monetary policy stance. 
Reflecting the importance of this issue, there is a well established empirical literature 
documenting the negative impact of monetary tightening on stock market returns. The seminal 
studies of Jensen and Johnson (1995), Thorbecke (1997), Patelis (1997), Lobo (2002) and 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) provide characteristic examples. Conover, Jensen and Johnson 
(1999) confirm this pattern in an international setting, while Lobo (2002) shows that monetary 
policy shocks have an effect on stock market volatility too. Using a dividend discount model for 
equity valuation, most researchers mainly focus on two ways through which monetary policy 
affects stock prices (see Smirlock and Yawitz, 1985). Monetary policy can affect the rates that 
market participants use to discount future cash flows as well as expected cash flows themselves 
(Patelis, 1997). 
There is an extensive theoretical literature discussing the transmission channels through 
which monetary policy affects companies’ operations (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988, 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). In particular, there are two well-
recognized channels: the balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel. Both these 
mechanisms are part of the credit channel of the monetary policy transmission process (see 
Walsh, 2003) that affects the external finance premium, i.e. the difference in cost between funds 
raised externally (e.g. new equity and debt) and funds generated internally (e.g. retained 
earnings).  
According to the balance sheet channel, a monetary tightening can reduce the company’s 
revenues due to lower consumer spending and increase its floating-rate interest payments, leading 
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to a significant reduction in its net cash flows. Moreover, it can reduce the value of its assets and 
hence the value of the collaterals posted for its loans. This process deteriorates the company’s 
interest coverage ratio and other indicators of its financial health, pulling the trigger of financial 
accelerator that amplifies the initial negative shock and magnifies the external finance premium 
due to an increase in the agency cost of debt. The bank lending channel has a more immediate 
effect. In a restrictive monetary environment, the total supply of intermediated credit is 
significantly reduced. Therefore, companies face more onerous credit terms or even a dramatic 
reduction in the level of funds they can borrow either from credit markets or from financial 
intermediaries. Consequently, net cash flows get considerably reduced and profitable projects are 
abandoned due to lack of funding. 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) offer two more potential effects of monetary policy on stock 
prices: its impact on the required risk premium and the potential excess sensitivity or overreaction 
of market participants to monetary policy shocks. As Bernanke and Kuttner (2005, p. 1205) 
mention: “A more tightly structured analysis that encompasses a wider class of assets may help to 
differentiate these interpretations. In any case further exploration of the link between monetary 
policy and the excess return on equities is an intriguing topic for future research”. Nevertheless, 
no sufficient evidence has been provided to confirm these conjectures. 
Despite the sound theoretical foundation of the previous arguments, few studies have 
attempted to directly link monetary policy shocks to the well documented stock market anomalies 
(e.g. size, value and momentum anomalies). Apart from broad stock market indices, most of the 
existing studies have focused on the behaviour of industry returns in an attempt to examine the 
cross-sectional variation in the impact of monetary policy shocks (Thorbecke, 1997, Jensen and 
Mercer, 2002 and Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005). But as Cochrane (2008, p. 314) notes: “The 
challenge is straightforward: We need to understand what macroeconomic risks underlie the 
“factor risk premia”, the average returns on special portfolios that finance research uses to 
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crystallize the cross section of assets. A current list might include […] the value and size 
premiums, the momentum premium. […] Having said “macroeconomics”, “risk” and “asset 
prices”, the reader will quickly spot a missing ingredient: money”. 
Our study utilizes a VAR framework in the spirit of Thorbecke (1997) and examines 
whether there is a differential contemporaneous impact of monetary policy shocks, as measured 
by innovations to the change in Federal funds’ rate, on stock portfolios formed on the basis of 
their size, value and past performance characteristics during the period 1967-2007. We argue that 
these widely used portfolios actually provide a more appropriate setting to examine the validity of 
the well established transmission channels as well as to test the conjecture regarding the existence 
of other possible channels. Moreover, we further contribute to the literature by also examining the 
portfolio returns’ impulse responses to monetary policy shocks beyond the first period. 
With respect to the traditional transmission channels, examining the differential impact of 
monetary policy shocks on portfolios formed on the basis of a series of value characteristics can 
help us shed light on the importance of the balance sheet channel. Moreover, to the extent that 
small companies are less well immunized against adverse monetary policy decisions and are 
characterized by weaker relationships with financial intermediaries, as compared to big 
companies, portfolios of stocks formed on the basis of their market value provide a valuable tool 
to identify the role of the bank lending channel. Both value and size portfolios allow us to 
examine whether the risk-premium channel mentioned in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) is active. 
 It should be mentioned that, starting from Fama and French (1995), there is a growing 
literature trying to reconcile stock market anomalies within a “hidden risk factor” framework. 
Interestingly, a lot of these studies use financial or macroeconomic variables, such as term and 
default spreads and the T-bill rate (Hahn, O’ Neill and Reyes, 2004, Petkova, 2006, Hahn and 
Lee, 2006), news related to GDP growth (Vassalou, 2003) and variation of credit market 
conditions over the business cycle (Perez-Quiros and Timmermmann, 2000). In the same spirit, 
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Aretz, Bartram and Pope (2010) utilized combinations of such variables to explain value, size and 
momentum anomalies within a GMM asset pricing framework. It has been well established that 
these variables are linked to monetary policy conditions (Stock and Watson, 1989, Gertler, 
Hubbard and Kashyap, 1991, Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein, 1994). Given this evidence, we argue 
that it is more intriguing to examine this potential link by considering the primary source of 
monetary policy shocks. 
Most interestingly, portfolios formed on the basis of stocks’ past performance at a five-
year, one-year and one-month horizon provide an ideal tool to examine the excess sensitivity 
conjecture. These portfolios are based solely on the companies’ past stock market performance, 
with no reference to their corporate characteristics, and hence explanations relying on the 
traditional channels are not applicable. Therefore, we are able to examine whether the excess 
sensitivity mechanism analyzed in studies trying to explain the momentum anomaly (see 
Jegadeesh and Titman, 2005, for a review) is present and whether this reaction is related to 
monetary policy shocks. This is not to say that we exclude the potential validity of the excess 
sensitivity mechanism to explain the value and size anomalies too (see Shleifer, 2000, for a 
detailed discussion).  
Among the notable previous studies that directly examined the differential impact of 
monetary policy shocks on the returns of portfolios constructed on the basis of stocks’ 
fundamental characteristics, Thorbecke (1997) utilized size portfolios, Jensen, Johnson and 
Mercer (1997), Guo (2004) and Maio and Tavares (2007) considered both value and size 
anomalies, while Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) and Basistha and Kurov (2007) investigated this 
issue using portfolios of financially constrained stocks. In comparison to Jensen et al. (1997), Guo 
(2004), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) and Basistha and Kurov (2007), we employ a more 
general VAR system instead of relying on single-equation models for returns and we use a much 
longer sample period. This extended sample period as well as the use of value proxies to examine 
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the balance sheet channel more appropriately makes our study distinct from Thorbecke (1997). In 
contrast to Maio and Tavares (2007), we use a macro-based VAR and conduct subsample analysis 
to reveal the time-varying nature of the relationship. The particularly innovative feature of the 
present study relative to the existing literature is the use of past performance ordered portfolios to 
examine the excess sensitivity mechanism conjectured by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). 
 Contributing further to the literature, we examine whether the impact of monetary policy 
shocks differs across monetary policy regimes. Laopodis (2006, 2010) provided extensive 
evidence for the time-varying relationship between Fed funds rate and the general stock price 
index. Park and Ratti (2000) also examined this relationship across different monetary policy 
regimes. If this impact varies through time, then this finding could be a potential explanation for 
the documented instability of some of these anomalies’ premia (see Horowitz, Loughran and 
Savin, 2000, Schwert, 2003, and Guidolin and Timmerman, 2008). Moreover, the time-variation 
of this impact can help us evaluate the hypothesis of Bernanke and Gertler (1995) that some 
channels for the transmission of monetary policy may become inactive. In particular, following 
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), we split the sample using 1983 as cut-off point since around that 
time Volcker’s disinflation mission was largely accomplished. Volcker’s first years of tenure were 
associated with strict anti-inflationary policies which eventually ushered the “great moderation” 
period, characterized by low inflation, interest rates and overall macroeconomic volatility. The 
selection of this time point for splitting the full sample period is strongly supported by the Chow-
type break test of Candelon and Lutkepohl (2001). 
 Previewing our results, we show that regardless of the employed value proxy, value stocks 
are considerably more sensitive to monetary policy shocks than growth stocks are in the full 
sample period, confirming the significance of the balance sheet transmission channel. However, 
the subperiod analysis shows that this differential impact was more pronounced only during the 
pre-1983 period. With respect to size ordered portfolios, we are able to offer an explanation for 
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the disappearance of the size premium in the post-1983 period. Small cap companies were 
considerably more sensitive to changes in the Fed funds rate only in the pre-1983 period, when 
actually the size premium was quite high. On the contrary, during the “great moderation” period, 
we find no differential impact of monetary policy shocks on the returns of small versus big cap 
stocks. Moreover, regardless of the frequency used, past losers are also considerably more 
sensitive to monetary policy shocks than past winners in the full sample period. This finding 
reinforces the appeal of excess sensitivity explanations for past performance anomalies and shows 
that monetary policy shocks may well be a source of information to which portfolios of stocks 
under- or over-react. Nevertheless, results from subperiod analysis indicate that the evidence on 
the excess sensitivity mechanism is strong only during the pre-1983 period. The differential 
responses for all these portfolios continue to hold even when we augment the benchmark VAR 
specification to incorporate a set of commonly used risk factors. 
The structure of our study is as follows. Section 2 analyzes the potential channels through 
which monetary policy shocks can affect stock prices of companies with different characteristics. 
Section 3 describes the dataset used in this study as well as various methodological issues. Section 
4 presents the benchmark full sample empirical results. Section 5 presents the results from a series 
of sensitivity checks and subsample stability analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Monetary policy transmission channels and stock returns  
 To illustrate the well established effects of monetary policy on stock prices, we employ the 
standard dividend discount model. After applying the commonly used transversality condition, the 
familiar version of this model is (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1996, p.256): 
1
1, ,1( )i
j
ji t t i t jRP E D
∞
= ++⎡ ⎤= ∑⎣ ⎦                                       (1) 
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where Pi,t is the price of stock i at time t and Ri is the rate used to discount the dividends Di,t+j that 
company i pays out from time t to t+j. 
As Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) point out, an increase in the Fed funds rate will cause a 
reduction in the stock price of company i for two main reasons. Firstly, the discount rate Ri will 
rise, since an increase in the Fed funds rate is usually associated with an increase in the short-term 
money market rates that are commonly used as discount rates (Kuttner, 2001). Secondly, 
expectations of future net cash flows (earnings and hence dividends) will be diminished, to the 
extent that a monetary contraction associated with an increase in the Fed funds rate hampers real 
economic activity (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
 Taking a step further and decomposing the discount rate Ri into the risk-free rate Rf and the 
risk premium RPi associated with company i, the dividend discount model can be written as:  
1
1, ,1
( )f
i
j
ji t t i t jR RP
P E D∞= ++ +⎡ ⎤= ∑⎣ ⎦                    (2) 
 It should be noted that the risk premium is allowed to be different across stocks with 
different characteristics. Following the arguments of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), this version of 
the model illustrates that the risk premium is an additional potential channel through which 
monetary policy shocks are transmitted to the stock market. Tight money could directly increase 
the riskiness of stocks by raising the interest costs or weakening the balance sheets of the firms. 
Additionally, tight money could reduce the willingness of stock investors to bear risk. 
Recognizing that risk premia differ for stock portfolios formed on the basis of different 
underlying characteristics allows us to argue that monetary policy shocks may have a differential 
impact on these portfolios’ returns. In particular, we examine whether the well documented size 
and value anomalies can be linked to reactions to monetary policy shocks. If the argument 
regarding the risk premium channel is valid, then the returns of small size and value stocks should 
be more sensitive to such shocks as compared to the returns of big capitalization and growth 
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stocks. Greater sensitivity to adverse monetary policy shocks implies greater exposure to a 
“hidden risk factor”, justifying the higher average returns that small cap and value stocks are 
typically found to yield.  
Moreover, the considerable time-variation that risk premia exhibit (see Lettau, Ludvigson 
and Wachter, 2007) and the instability in the anomalies’ premia (see Horowitz, Loughran and 
Savin, 2000, Schwert, 2003, and Guidolin and Timmerman, 2008) motivates us to examine 
whether stock portfolios’ returns respond differently to such shocks under different monetary 
policy regimes. Evidence of a link between the observed risk premia and exposure to monetary 
policy shocks over time would indicate support for the conjecture that monetary policy risk may 
be an important factor behind these premia. 
With respect to size ordered portfolios, there are a series of arguments why small cap 
stocks’ returns could be more sensitive to changes in the Fed funds rates. Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1994) extensively argued that a monetary tightening should affect more severely small size 
companies because these are typically less well immunized against such an adverse economic 
condition. This is a reasonable hypothesis since optimal risk management procedures are too 
costly for small companies to bear. Moreover, these companies are less well collateralized and, as 
a result, they are more likely to be harmed due to the “flight to quality lending” by creditors 
(Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist, 1994). 
There are a series of studies examining the impact of capital market imperfections on 
corporate investment that use size as a proxy for financially constrained companies (see e.g. 
Fazzari et al., 1988 and Kashyap et al., 1994). This is because small companies are typically 
younger firms, they have limited ability to issue commercial paper and face higher agency costs 
of debt, finding it more difficult to raise capital due to their limited ownership base. Moreover, 
small companies have restricted access to intermediated credit, and hence on the advent of an 
overall reduced supply of bank loans, these companies are typically the first to be cut off their 
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credit lines. The previous arguments lead to the conclusion that, in the face of a monetary 
tightening, the increase in the external cost of finance will be more pronounced for small 
companies, making them more risky for investors.  
Portfolios of value stocks are also expected to be more exposed to monetary policy risk as 
compared to portfolios of growth stocks. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) argue that a monetary 
tightening, by increasing interest rates, can worsen cash flow net of interest and thus firms’ 
balance sheet positions, pulling the trigger of the financial accelerator (see also Bernanke et al. 
1994). Value stocks are more heavily exposed to this type of risk since by construction they are 
characterized by high cash flows (earnings, dividends etc.) in current times and the near future 
relative to their market prices. On the other hand, since growth stocks have low current earnings-
to-price and book-to-market value ratios, investors expect that these companies will realize their 
cash flows in the distant future. Therefore, a temporary monetary tightening should not greatly 
affect them. 
 Along the lines of the previous arguments, since value stocks are more heavily dependent 
on cash flows than growth stocks, a reduction in the level of their revenues and earnings will 
oblige them to seek external finance for their current operations, exactly when this becomes more 
costly. Monetary policy shocks affect mainly the short-end of the term structure (Kuttner, 2001), 
and hence the short-term cost of financing that is of particular importance for value stocks. To the 
contrary, growth companies are expected to rely on long-term borrowing due to long-term 
business plans; therefore, increases in short-term rates should not be as harmful for growth stocks 
as they are for value stocks. 
This line of reasoning is consistent with the “good beta, bad beta” explanation of the value 
premium proposed by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), where interest rate risk (to which 
growth stocks are predominantly exposed) is termed “good beta” because an interest rate shock is 
reversible through time, while cash flow risk (to which value stocks are mainly exposed) is “bad 
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beta” since negative cash flow shocks are almost irreversible.1 More generally, default risk 
increases more for companies with cash flow problems. This argument underlies the explanation 
for the value premium provided by Fama and French (1995), who argue that value firms are 
usually firms that have been in distress for a substantial period, they are more likely to be credit-
constrained and, hence, more sensitive to monetary policy shocks than growth firms (see Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher, 2004, and Basistha and Kurov, 2007, for a discussion). Zhang (2005) proposes a 
mechanism based upon costly reversibility, a technological friction, to provide a rational 
expectations consistent explanation of the value premium. More specifically, in Zhang’s (2005) 
model, when firms try reduce their capital they face higher costs as opposed to when they try to 
expand, which in combination with the countercyclical price of risk causes value firms to be 
riskier than growth firms, especially in bad times when the price of risk is high. 
 Going beyond the traditional risk-based explanations that relate corporate and economic 
fundamentals to monetary policy shocks, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005, p. 1254) hinted that 
market participants may also overreact to policy actions and this could explain the large 
movements in excess returns following changes in the Fed funds rates. Interestingly, Kurov 
(2009) documents that monetary policy decisions have a significant effect on investor sentiment, 
especially during bear markets. This argument actually uncovers another potential transmission 
channel of monetary policy to the stock market, drawing a crucial link with the well-established 
behavioral finance literature. A series of studies have documented that investors tend to overreact 
or underreact to news, driving market prices to levels not easily justified by fundamentals (see the 
seminal studies of Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994 and Daniel and Titman, 1997). A strand 
of the literature documents long-term reversals in stock prices (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985) and 
                                                 
1 Supporting this explanation, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) report that after a positive shock to the Fed funds rate, 
corporate income is considerably reduced and it takes more than eight quarters till it starts recovering. On the other 
hand, the Fed funds rates itself absorbs this shock in less than eight months. 
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the outperformance of momentum strategies (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). The excess sensitivity 
of market participants to good and bad news is the core mechanism that rationalizes these findings 
(see Shleifer, 2000, for an extensive analysis). 
 Using portfolios formed solely on the basis of stocks’ prior performance could shed light 
on the potential excess sensitivity channel. In particular, forming portfolios of stocks categorized 
as winners or losers at a 5-year, 1-year and 1-month horizon without any further information on 
their corporate characteristics can isolate the effect of the excess sensitivity mechanism, since the 
standard arguments referring to the credit channel and the external cost of finance do not apply in 
this case. Therefore, documenting a differential impact of monetary policy shocks on the returns 
of winners’ portfolios versus losers’ portfolios at various frequencies implies that this mechanism 
is active and that monetary policy shocks may well be a source of news to which investors react.  
 It should be acknowledged that the overreaction hypothesis has been employed to explain 
the size, value and contrarian premia too (see Shleifer, 2000). For example, according to this line 
of reasoning, stocks exhibit high earnings-to-price and book-to-market value ratios due to the 
overreaction of investors to bad prior earnings and corporate news, driving down their prices and 
market values. Therefore we do not exclude the validity of the overreaction explanation for these 
premia; we just claim that past performance ordered portfolios provide a more appropriate 
laboratory to examine this potential transmission mechanism of monetary policy shocks, since we 
can isolate it from the other traditional channels that may well apply to value and size ordered 
portfolios, as previously discussed.   
 
3. Methodology and data 
Consider the augmented vector autoregressive model of order p (VAR(p)): 
1
p
t i t i t ti −== + +∑y Φ y Θz ε               (3) 
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where yt is an m x 1 vector of jointly determined dependent variables, zt is an q x 1 vector of 
deterministic and/or exogenous variables, Φi and Θ are m x m and m x q coefficient matrices, and 
εt  is the vector error process. Pesaran and Shin (1998) make the following assumptions:  (i) E(εt) 
= 0,  '( )t tE =ε ε Ω , where Ω  is an m x m positive definite matrix, and ( )t tE =ε z 0 ;  (ii) All the 
roots of 
1
0p im ii z=− =∑I Φ  lie outside the unit circle, where Im is the m x m identity matrix; (iii) 
yt-1,…, yt-p, zt are not perfectly collinear.  Assumption (ii) implies that yt is covariance-stationary 
and therefore Eq. (3) can be rewritten as an infinite vector moving average process: 
      
0 0t i t i i t ii i
∞ ∞
− −= == +∑ ∑y Ψ ε Λ z     (4) 
where 1 1 ...    ( 1, 2,...)i i p i p i− −= + + =Ψ Φ Ψ Φ Ψ  are the m x m coefficient matrices, Ψ0 = Im,  Ψi = 0 
for i < 0, and Λi = Ψi Θ.  
 The Cholesky factorisation (Sims, 1980) implies that a lower m x m triangular matrix C 
exists such that ' =CC Ω . It is well-known that the resulting impulse response functions are 
dependent upon the ordering of the variables in the VAR (see e.g. Lutkepohl, 1991, section 2.3.2).  
This is a crucial shortcoming given the uncertainty that surrounds the relationships among macro-
financial variables in terms of direction of causality. Pesaran and Shin (1998) propose an 
alternative approach, the Generalized Impulse Response (GIR) function, which is invariant to the 
ordering of the variables in the VAR and show that significant differences may arise in the 
empirical results from the Cholesky and the GIR methods. The GIR from a shock to the j-th 
variable is calculated using a variable-specific Cholesky decomposition computed with the j-th 
variable at the top of the Cholesky ordering.  
 In our empirical analysis we use the GIR function for the main results. . We present and 
discuss both initial period (Section 4.1) and multi-period (Section 4.2) generalized impulse 
responses. For robustness, though, we also calculate in Section 5.1 impulse response functions 
using the Cholesky decomposition with an ordering scheme similar to the one adopted by 
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Thorbecke (1997). The latter identification scheme places stock returns at the end of the ordering 
chain effectively assuming that the stock market reacts to macroeconomic developments but has 
no impact itself on these developments  
The endogenous variables vector is '[ , , , , , ]t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin r=y  where ipnt = 
100*Δlog(indt) is the growth rate of industrial production (ind); inft =100*Δlog(cpit) is the growth 
rate of consumer price index (cpi) that is, the inflation rate; gcomt =100*Δlog(comt) is the growth 
rate of a commodity price index (com); dfedt =Δ(fedt) is the change in the federal funds rate (fed); 
strongint is the portion of non-borrowed reserves that is orthogonal to total reserves2; rjt is the 
nominal return on stock portfolio j.  
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the macroeconomic variables that are 
included in the VAR. The growth rate of industrial production is, on average, equal to 0.21% per 
month (i.e. 2.5% p.a.), while consumer prices have increased, on average, by 0.38% per month 
(4.5% p.a.). The bad macroeconomic outlook of the mid-1970s is exemplified by the fact that 
industrial production growth reached a minimum of -3.6% per month in 1974.12, while inflation 
peaked at 1.8% per month in 1973.08. Commodity prices have not risen as fast as consumer 
prices, with the average monthly growth rate of the former being equal to 0.23%, but have been 
overall significantly more volatile. The Federal funds rate was quite volatile during the early 
1980s with the largest positive change, 0.25% per month (i.e. 3.1% p.a.), recorded in 1980.03 and 
soon followed by the largest negative change, -0.55% per month (i.e. -6.6% p.a.), in 1980.05.     
For robustness, we estimate VARs with real (net of inflation) portfolio returns as well as 
returns in excess of the Treasury bill rate. The price, output, and money stocks data are seasonally 
                                                 
2 The strongin variable is calculated as the residual from a regression of (logged) non-borrowed reserves on total 
reserves. Strongin (1995) argues that the Fed influences the market for reserves by modifying the mix of non-
borrowed reserves to meet current reserve demand. 
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adjusted. The frequency of the variables in our dataset is monthly, while the sample period under 
investigation is 1967.01-2007.12. The source for the macroeconomic variables is IMF-
International Financial Statistics. Monetary policy shocks are measured using the innovations in 
the federal funds rate change (dfed).3  Doing so, we avoid potential problems of non-stationarity 
that may be present in Thorbecke’s (1997) specification. The lag length of the VAR was selected 
by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). In Section 5.1 we further check the robustness of our 
results by using the sequential likelihood ratio (LR) test of Lutkepohl (1991) to determine the lag 
length of the VAR. Furthermore, we conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to model 
specification and subsample stability in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, respectively.  
The source for stock portfolios’ returns is the widely used Kenneth French’s online data 
library.4 For the size anomaly we use the value-weighted monthly returns of the 10 portfolios 
formed on the basis of stocks’ market value. For the value anomaly we employ four different 
proxies; we utilize the value-weighted monthly returns of the 10 portfolios sorted according to 
stocks’ cash flow-to-price ratio (where cash flow is defined as earnings before extraordinary items 
plus deferred tax income and common equity’s share of depreciation), earnings-to-price ratio 
(where earnings stand for EBITDA before extraordinary items), dividend-to-price ratio and book 
                                                 
3 US monetary policy operating procedures have undergone various changes since the end of the Bretton Woods fixed 
exchange rate system in the early 1970s. These chronologically correspond to periods of federal funds rate (1972-
1979), non-borrowed reserves (1979-1982), borrowed reserves (1982-1988) and federal funds rate (1988-present) 
operating procedures. As Walsh (2003, p.462) points out, “…in no case did the Fed’s behaviour reflect pure examples 
of any one type”. Nevertheless, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998), among others, point 
out that the federal funds rate has been the key policy instrument in the US and therefore unexpected changes in this 
rate should provide good estimates of policy shocks. Moreover, Cook (1989) finds that even during the 1979-1982 
period of non-borrowed reserves operating procedure, the funds rate provides a satisfactory indicator since most of its 
changes reflected policy actions.  
4 This library is available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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equity-to-market value of equity ratio. Moreover, we use the value-weighted monthly returns of 
the 25 double-sorted Fama-French portfolios on size and book-to-market value. With respect to 
past performance anomalies we use value-weighted monthly returns of 10 portfolios formed at the 
end of month t-1 on the basis of stocks’ past returns. In particular, for the long-term reversal 
anomaly, prior performance refers to stocks’ returns from month t-60 to month t-13. For the 
momentum anomaly, the sorting criterion is stocks’ returns from month t-12 to month t-2, while 
for the short-term reversal anomaly, prior performance corresponds to the return of month t-1. 
Finally, we use CRSP value-weighted returns as a proxy for market return. 
 
4. Empirical results, full sample, 1967-2007 
4.1 Initial period impulse responses 
 Table 2 reports the full sample VAR estimation results and the average returns for our 
portfolios. The AIC selects two lags in all cases.5 We show the initial period generalized impulse 
response of the first and tenth deciles for each of the value, size and past performance related 
portfolios to a monetary policy shock. The standard errors indicate that in all cases the impulse 
response point estimates are statistically different from zero at the 10% level of significance, with 
the great majority of the cases being significant at the 5% level.6  
 The results show that a one standard deviation innovation in the federal funds rate change 
depresses value portfolio returns more than growth portfolio returns, across all proxies of value.  
For example, using the book-to-market ratio, we find that following a contractionary shock, value 
(decile 10) portfolio returns are on average 0.86% lower per month, while growth (decile 1) 
                                                 
5 The estimated VARs are stationary, since all roots of the characteristic VAR polynomials lie outside the unit circle 
implying that the impulse responses eventually die out to zero and that their standard errors are valid (results 
available upon request). 
6 Analytic (asymptotic) standard errors are used.  Monte Carlo standard errors yield very similar results. 
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portfolio returns are depressed by 0.51%, generating a monthly impact differential of 0.35%. For 
comparison, note that the initial period generalized impulse response of the market index’s 
monthly return to a monetary policy shock is -0.65% (i.e. -7.8% p.a.), lying close to the middle of 
the distance between the value and growth impulse responses.7 The monthly value-growth impact 
differential corresponds to an annualized figure of 4.14%, suggesting that value stocks portfolios 
are considerably more exposed to monetary policy risk.  
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
Similar monetary policy impact differentials are obtained using the other value proxies, 
with the annualized differential ranging from 3.14%, using the dividend-to-price ratio, to 4.56%, 
using the earnings-to-price ratio. At the same time, Table 2 shows that value investment strategies 
provide higher returns, as compared to investment in growth stocks, with the returns’ differential 
reaching 6.72% p.a. in the case of book-to-market portfolios. Thus, the results suggest that the 
high exposure of value stocks to monetary policy risk may be an important factor behind the 
premium that value stocks offer over growth stocks. These findings highlight the importance of 
the balance sheet transmission channel; they are also supportive for Bernanke and Kuttner’s 
(2005) risk premium argument.8  
                                                 
7 The R2 for the market return regression is 3% indicating that only a small portion of stock market volatility is 
explained by aggregate economic variables. The R2 takes values between 1% and 10% across the various value, size 
and past performance portfolio returns regressions, with a mode of 3%. These findings are broadly consistent with 
Shiller’s (1981) finding of excess stock market volatility.   
8 Results for the remaining deciles are not shown to save space but are available upon request. Overall, they indicate 
the presence of two general trends. Moving from extreme growth (decile 1) towards extreme value (decile 10) 
portfolios, the average return differential and the monetary policy impact differential increase in magnitude. 
Movements along these trend lines, however, are not strictly monotonic. Similar non-strictly monotonic trends are 
present in the size and past-performance related portfolios. Thorbecke’s (1997) evidence for size sorted portfolios is 
consistent with our findings regarding lack of strict monotonicity.    
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Moving on to size sorted portfolios and comparing small market value portfolios (decile 1) 
with large market value portfolios (decile 10), findings in Table 2 indicate that small stocks are 
more exposed to monetary policy risk and provide higher returns. The results suggest that the 
bank lending channel has been active, while this evidence is in line with the risk premium 
explanation too. Nevertheless, the monetary policy impact differentials and corresponding premia 
are generally smaller as compared to the cases of the value portfolios. The impulse response to a 
monetary tightening shock is -0.66% for small stocks and -0.56% for large stocks, suggesting an 
annualized impact differential of 1.22%. As the following subsection shows, significant 
subsample instability plays a crucial role in explaining the relatively low magnitude of the risk 
premium associated with small stocks.  
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
To gain some insight in the interaction of the value and size anomaly, we report in Table 3 
the results from double-sorted size and book-to-market portfolios. Four interesting features arise. 
First, all of the estimated impulse responses are significantly different from zero.  Second, the 
evidence supports the existence of a value gradient with respect to monetary policy shocks since 
in each size-related quintile the impact of shocks is stronger for value stocks. Third, there is also a 
size gradient since comparison of growth (or value) stocks’ responses across size quintiles reveals 
an increase in the magnitude of the reaction as we shift from large to small stocks. Fourth, large 
growth stocks display the weakest monetary policy impact (-0.49%) and small value stocks the 
strongest (-0.84%), generating an annualized impact differential of 4.17%. This finding suggests 
that the historical premium of around 9% p.a. for small value stocks over large growth stocks may 
be driven by the significantly higher exposure of the former to monetary policy risk. Hence, value 
and size premia appear to be jointly related to monetary policy shifts, not only in isolation. 
Finally, we turn our attention back to Table 2 to examine the results from past 
performance related portfolios. The general pattern that emerges is that the impact of monetary 
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policy shocks is stronger for a portfolio of stocks that have performed poorly in the past (losers), 
irrespectively of the time horizon used for their classification, i.e. distant past (5-years), recent 
past (1-year) and very recent past (1-month). Results from short-term reversal portfolios indicate 
that, following a contractionary monetary policy shock, returns are on average 0.81% lower per 
month for very recent past losers (decile 1) and 0.57% lower for very recent past winners (decile 
10). This loser-winner differential impact on returns corresponds to an annualized figure of 
2.84%. This is the highest differential across past performance related portfolios, with the 
corresponding figure for momentum and long-term reversal portfolios being equal to 1.43% and 
1.67%, respectively. Furthermore, in every case examined, the impulse response of past losers to 
unexpected tightening is more pronounced when compared to response of the market index, 
indicating excess sensitivity of past losers to policy actions.   
The previous results show that there is no overall correspondence between premia and 
impact differentials for past winners and losers. Therefore, a risk premium based explanation may 
not uniformly apply, especially for the case of momentum portfolios. In fact, Shleifer (2000) 
argues that risk premium explanations of the momentum anomaly are not prevalent, while 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2005) and Fama and French (1996) cannot explain momentum 
either using multi-factor models. This may be true since these portfolios are based solely on the 
companies’ past stock market performance, with no reference to their corporate characteristics. 
Consequently, the evidence for a cross-sectional differential in the response to monetary policy 
shocks, with past losers being more heavily penalized than past winners, regardless of the 
employed horizon of past returns, supports the excess sensitivity conjecture of Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2005). Nevertheless, we should mention that the risk premium explanation may still be 
valid for the long-term and short-term reversal anomalies, since the premia that losers offer are 
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accompanied by a greater sensitivity to monetary policy shocks.9 
 
4.2 Multiperiod impulse responses 
In order to examine the stock portfolios’ response to a monetary policy shock over time, in 
Figures 1 to 3 we correspondingly plot the generalized impulse responses of value (book-to-
market), size and past performance (past year) related portfolios to a one-standard deviation shock 
to the change in the Federal funds rate over an 8-month period. Likewise, Figure 4 shows 
multiperiod impulse responses using double-sorted size and book-to-market portfolios.  Two 
interesting features are apparent.10 First, the point estimate of the impulse response does not 
immediately die out following the initial period. Indeed, it takes a number of months, typically 
five months, for the point estimate of the impulse response function to collapse to zero. This 
implies that monetary policy shocks are not immediately fully absorbed, indicating the possibility 
that stock market investors may underreact over time to monetary policy news. Nevertheless, as 
the second common feature of the graphs indicates, beyond the first month we cannot make strong 
statistical inferences. With the exception of the third month impulse response point estimate in 
certain cases, taking the 95% confidence interval into account typically suggests that the impulse 
responses are not significantly different from zero. Thus, the multiperiod impulse response 
analysis points out that the negative impact of unexpected changes in the federal funds rate upon 
the stock market is relatively short-lived but not strictly instantaneous as a perfectly efficient 
market would imply. However, one should be cautious in extracting strong conclusions since 
                                                 
9 Indeed, as Fama and French (1996) point out, the reversal of long-term returns documented by De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) can be explained within their three factor model given that stocks with low long-term past returns tend to be 
smaller and relatively distressed. 
10 Similar features are displayed by the remaining value and past performance related portfolios. Results are available 
upon request.   
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these findings lie only at the border of statistical significance.    
[FIGURES 1-4 HERE] 
5.  Further results 
5.1 Full sample, robustness analysis 
 Table 4 reports the full sample VAR estimation results using real portfolio returns. The 
estimated impulse responses and standard errors are almost identical to those reported in Table 2 
using nominal returns. Thus, the patterns that we identified in nominal returns are also present in 
real returns and our results are robust to adjusting for the effect of inflation.11 This finding can be 
explained on the basis of the stylized fact that the volatility of nominal stock returns is much 
greater as compared to inflation volatility and consequently the volatility of real returns is 
dominated by the volatility of nominal returns. For example, in the case of market portfolio’s 
returns, the ratio of the standard deviations of nominal returns to real returns is equal to 0.99 over 
the full sample period.  
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 Table 5 shows the full sample VAR estimation results using the Cholesky decomposition 
to calculate impulse responses. This identification scheme follows the ordering of variables in the 
yt vector and is therefore similar to Thorbecke (1997). The estimated impulse responses and 
standard errors are very similar to those reported in Table 2 implying that the results are robust to 
the choice of methodology that underlies the impulse response function’s calculation. 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
Finally, Table 6 shows the findings from a sensitivity check regarding the criterion used to 
specify the VAR’s lag length. The reported full sample VAR estimation results are based upon the 
                                                 
11 Similar findings were obtained when we used returns in excess of the T-bill rate. Results are available upon 
request.     
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sequential LR test of Lutkepohl (1991) as means of lag length selection. The LR criterion selects a 
greater number of lags as compared to the AIC. Particularly, across all portfolios, either 10 or 12 
lags are selected resulting into richer dynamics for the VAR. Comparison with the evidence 
provided in Table 2 indicates that the estimated impulse responses generally decline when 
additional lags are introduced in the VAR, while the standard errors are not affected. The decline 
in magnitude of the impulse responses is rather mild, so 14 out of 16 total responses remain 
significantly different from zero. 
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
 Results from the sensitivity analysis with respect to alternative measures of returns, 
definition of impulse response functions and lag length selection criterion indicate that the full 
sample results are quite robust. Overall, implied impulse response differentials suggest that small, 
value, and loser stocks are more exposed to monetary policy shifts.  
 
5.2 Alternative VAR specifications 
 In order to examine whether innovations in the federal funds rate reflect risks that are 
already embedded in existing factors, we alternatively augment the baseline VAR with the factors 
proposed earlier by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997), and more recently by Chen, 
Novy-Marx and Zhang (2010). Inclusion of these factors in the VAR system ensures that, by 
construction, the resulting monetary policy shocks will be orthogonal to them. Hence, finding that 
innovations in the federal funds rate continue to exert a negative and statistically significant impact 
upon the returns of different portfolios would imply that the impact of monetary policy shocks is 
not subsumed by the risk factors that have been used in the literature.  
 We consider four alternative cases to the baseline VAR. Case I refers to the structure 
'[ , , , , , , ]t t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin xmark r=y  where xmarkt stands for the excess market 
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returns, as implied by the CAPM. Case II adds the Size (smbt) and Value (hmlt) factors of Fama 
and French (1993): '[ , , , , , , , , ]t t t t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin xmark smb hml r=y . Case III further 
augments the baseline VAR specification using Carhart’s (1997) Momentum (momt) factor: 
'[ , , , , , , , , , ]t t t t t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin xmark smb hml mom r=y . Finally, Case IV refers to the 
structure '[ , , , , , , , , ]t t t t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin xmark roa inv r=y  where roat and invt stand for 
the Return-on-Assets and Investment factors of Chen et al. (2010).12 
 Table 7 reports the full sample VAR estimation results under Cases I-IV for the value, size 
and past performance related portfolios.13  In line with the baseline VAR results in Table 2, the 
initial period generalized impulse response point estimates in all four alternative cases are negative 
and significantly different from zero for all portfolios. The estimated impulse responses and 
standard errors are very similar to those of the baseline model. For example, using the book-to-
market ratio, we find that following a contractionary shock, value portfolio returns decline by 
between 0.82% (Case III) and 0.86% (Case I) per month, with the corresponding figure in the 
benchmark VAR being 0.86%.  Overall, the corresponding impulse response differentials suggest 
that the finding that small, value, and loser stocks are more affected by monetary policy shocks is 
robust to model specification. Hence, our results indicate that the impact of monetary policy 
shocks is not subsumed by the traditional and recently proposed risk factors.  
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
                                                 
12 Chen et al. (2010) three-factor model is motivated by q-theory (see e.g. Tobin, 1969). According to this model, the 
expected return on a portfolio of stocks in excess of the risk-free rate is described by the sensitivity of its return to 
three factors: the excess market returns, the difference between the return on a portfolio of stocks with high Returns-
on-Assets (ROA) and the return on a portfolio of stocks with low ROA, and the difference between the return on a 
portfolio of low-investment stocks and the return on a portfolio of high-investment stocks.  
13 It should be noted that Case IV results are not fully comparable with the rest of the findings, since the database 
made available on Lu Zhang’s website starts from January 1972. 
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 Table 8 shows the full sample estimation results for double-sorted size and book-to-market 
portfolios using the augmented VAR models I-IV. Comparing these results with those in Table 3 
for the baseline VAR, it is apparent that the estimated impulse responses and standard errors 
remain largely unchanged when the additional factors enter the VAR. For example, in Case I, we 
find that following an unexpected monetary policy tightening, small value stocks display the 
strongest decline, 0.87% per month, as compared to the benchmark VAR finding of 0.84%. 
Hence, the baseline findings of statistical significance of the negative impulse point estimates, and 
existence of size and value gradient appear robust to controlling for the effects of the commonly 
used risk factors.  
[TABLE 8 HERE] 
 5.3 Subperiod analysis 
 The appointment of Paul Volcker as chairman of the Fed in the summer of 1979 and the 
adoption of a strict anti-inflationary stance represented a major shift in US monetary policy. As 
Alan Greenspan (2007, p.84) characteristically notes, “From the moment he was sworn in, 
Volcker knew that his job was…to ‘slay the inflationary dragon’”.14 Nevertheless, as Goodfriend 
and King (2005) point out, the adjustment of inflation expectations towards a lower level was not 
rapid. Mojon (2008) also argues that the first years of the Federal Reserve under Volcker 
correspond to an ‘‘incredible disinflation’’. In line with these arguments, Clarida et al. (2000) 
suggest removing the first three years of the Volcker era from the entire Volcker-Greenspan 
sample since this period exhibits some idiosyncratic features.15 More specifically, it is 
                                                 
14 Indeed, Clarida et al. (2000) estimate a forward looking monetary policy reaction function and show that US 
interest rate policy in the Volcker-Greenspan period seems more sensitive to changes in expected inflation than in the 
pre-Volcker period. 
15 The post-1983 period is dominated by Greenspan’s tenure (1987.08-2006.01) but it also includes the first twenty 
three months of Bernanke’s tenure (2006.02-2007.12) as Fed chairman. 
 24
characterized by non-borrowed reserves targeting and a large one-off disinflationary episode. The 
Federal funds rate was high and quite volatile between 1979 and 1982. A large portion of this 
increased interest rate volatility can be attributed to the imposition and then removal of credit 
controls during the early 1980s (Walsh, 2003).  
 By 1983 Volcker’s disinflation mission was largely accomplished with inflation reduced 
to 3% p.a. from around 12% p.a. in 1980. This allowed interest rates to decline and eventually 
ushered a new era of low overall macroeconomic volatility, the so-called “great moderation” 
period. Lettau, Ludvigson and Wachter (2007) find that the reduction in macroeconomic risk 
explains, to an extent, the declining equity premium and persistently high stock market valuations 
that were observed towards the end of last century. Thus, there is strong motivation from both a 
monetary policy and an asset pricing viewpoint to examine the structural stability of our findings 
with respect to a sample split related to the completion of Volcker’s disinflation mission and the 
beginning of a new regime characterized by lower macroeconomic risk. Moreover, a structural 
break at the start of 1983 is strongly supported by our findings from applying Candelon and 
Lutkepohl’s (2001) break-point Chow-type test for parameter stability of the estimated VAR 
models.16  
[TABLE 9 HERE] 
 Table 9 reports the VAR estimation results and the average returns for the value, size and 
past performance related portfolios during the subsample periods 1967.01-1982.12 and 1983.01-
2007.12.  Evidence from value portfolios indicates that all impulse responses are significantly 
different from zero during the pre-Volcker period and the first three years of Volcker’s era. The 
                                                 
16 See Candelon and Lutkepohl (2001) for more details on the calculation of the test. Using 1982.12 as the potential 
break date, the test is significant at the 1% level. We also examined the possibility of a break related to Volcker’s 
appointment at 1979.08. In this case, the break-point test statistic is reduced by around 50% and is significant at the 
5% or 10% level only. Results are available upon request.  
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magnitude of these responses indicates that value stocks are more affected by a monetary policy 
shock than growth stocks. The implied impact differentials are larger as compared to the full 
sample results reported in Table 2.  For example, using book-to-market ratio portfolios, we find 
that a contractionary shock depresses value stocks returns by 1.39% per month and growth stocks 
returns by 0.78%, generating a monthly impact differential of 0.61%, which exceeds the 
corresponding full sample figure of 0.35%.  On the other hand, during the 1983.01-2007.12 
subperiod, the majority of the impulse responses of value-sorted portfolios are not statistically 
significant.  This suggests that the full sample results are largely driven by developments that took 
place prior to the “great moderation”.  
 Since the early 1980s, value stocks are less exposed or not exposed at all to monetary 
policy risk, depending on the value proxy, offering at the same time a smaller premium over 
growth stocks. Referring still to book-to-market value ratio portfolios, the value-growth premium 
falls from around 9% p.a. to 5% p.a. as we move from the first subsample to the second. Hence, 
the impact of monetary policy shocks on value portfolios and the value premium itself both 
decrease in the second subsample period.  
 Similar patterns are observed in size-sorted portfolios. The difference in average returns 
between small and large stocks stands quite high, at around 10% p.a., during the first subperiod 
but disappears in the second subperiod. Moreover, the impulse responses to monetary policy 
shocks become similar in magnitude and statistically insignificant for both small and large stocks.  
These findings suggest that the premium that small stocks were offering during the 1970s was 
related to exposure to monetary policy risk. 
 The time-variation of the monetary policy impact on value and size portfolios supports the 
conjecture of Bernanke and Gertler (1995) that some channels of the monetary policy 
transmission may become less active in some periods. Bernake and Gertler (1995) argue that the 
bank lending channel has been weakened due to financial deregulation in the 1980s, including the 
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removal of “Regulation Q” which placed limits on the deposit rates that banks could offer and 
was therefore hampering the ability of banks to compete for funds. Moreover, since the 1980s 
banks have gained greater access to funds by issuing certificates of deposits, while the market for 
bank liabilities has also expanded. From the borrowers’ viewpoint, the deepening of the market 
for commercial paper during the 1980s and the 1990s enhanced the availability of non-bank 
sources of finance.  Finally, we should also point out that the establishment and subsequent 
popularity of the futures market on Federal funds rate in 1989 has improved the ability of 
companies to hedge interest rate risk. The aforementioned developments have enhanced the 
ability of small and value firms to endure tight money periods, putting a downward pressure on 
the related risk premia.  
  Subsample analysis for portfolios sorted on the basis of stocks’ past performance reveals 
that the estimated impulse responses are generally statistically significant during 1967-1982 with 
loser stocks being more affected by monetary policy shocks, as compared to winners. The implied 
monetary policy impact differentials exceed those observed in the full sample. During 1983-2007, 
however, all impulse responses turn out to be statistically insignificant. This result implies that the 
excess sensitivity mechanism, according to which investors penalize past losers more severely 
than past winners when unexpected monetary tightening occurs, is not stable over time. 
Therefore, this potential transmission mechanism may have become inactive too. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 This study has investigated whether stocks with different characteristics are affected in a 
differential manner by unexpected monetary policy actions. We have utilized a VAR framework 
to study how monetary policy shocks, as measured by innovations to the change in Federal funds’ 
rate, affect returns of portfolios formed according to value, size, and past performance, using US 
data from the United States over the period 1967-2007. Our full sample results show significant 
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differences in the initial period impact of policy shocks across the sample portfolios, with value, 
small and loser stocks being more exposed to monetary policy risk. Interestingly, albeit on the 
border of statistical significance, the point estimates of the portfolios returns’ impulse responses 
do not immediately die out following the initial period as a perfectly efficient market setup would 
imply.  
 Furthermore, we have examined the structural stability of these relationships and found 
that a significant break occurred in early 1980s, associated with the accomplishment of Volcker’s 
disinflation mission and the beginning of the “great moderation” period, characterized by lower 
inflation, interest rates and overall macroeconomic volatility. The subsample analysis indicates 
that monetary policy impact differentials and premia for value and small stocks appear to covary 
through time, being quite high during the 1970s and declining substantially, from the early 1980s 
onwards.  The change in the response of small and value stocks to monetary policy shocks that we 
documented during the post-1983 period suggests that the bank lending and balance sheet 
mechanisms that underlie the credit channel of the monetary transmission process are not 
necessarily always active. We finally document that the response of past performance sorted 
portfolios displays remarkable instability over time, with losers’ portfolios being more sensitive to 
monetary policy shocks relative to winners’ portfolios, only prior to the “great moderation” 
period. 
  
 
 28
References 
Aretz, K., Bartram, S.M., Pope, P.F., 2010. Macroeconomic risks and characteristic-based factor 
models. Journal of Banking and Finance 34, 1383-1399. 
 
Basistha, A., Kurov, A., 2008. Macroeconomic cycles and the stock market’s reactions to 
monetary policy. Journal of Banking and Finance 32, 2606-2616. 
 
Bernanke, B.S., Gertler, M., 1989. Agency costs, net worth and business fluctuations. American 
Economic Review 79, 14-31. 
 
Bernanke, B.S., Blinder, A.S., 1992. The Federal funds rate and the channels of monetary 
transmission. American Economic Review 82, 901-921. 
 
Bernanke, B.S., Gertler, M., 1995. Inside the black box: The credit channel of monetary policy 
transmission. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, 27-48. 
 
Bernanke, B.S., Gertler, M., Gilchrist, S., 1994. The financial accelerator and the flight to quality. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 78, 1-15. 
 
Bernanke, B.S., Mihov, I., 1998. Measuring monetary policy. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
113, 869-902. 
 
Bernanke B.S., Kuttner, K.N., 2005. What explains the stock market’s reaction to Federal Reserve 
Policy?. Journal of Finance 60, 1221-1257. 
 
Campbell, J.Y., Vuolteenaho, T., 2004. Bad beta, good beta. American Economic Review 94, 
1249-1275. 
 
Campbell, J.Y., Lo, A.W., McKinlay, A.C., 1996. The econometrics of financial markets. 
Princeton University Press, NJ. 
 
Candelon, B., Lutkepohl, H., 2001. On the reliability of Chow-type tests for parameter constancy 
in multivariate dynamic models. Economics Letters 73, 155-160. 
 
Carhart, M., 1997. On persistence in mutual fund performance. Journal of Finance 52, 57-82. 
 
Chen, L., Novy-Marx, R., Zhang, L., 2010. An Alternative Three-Factor Model. SSRN working 
paper. 
 
Clarida, R., Gali, J., Gertler, M., 2000. Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability: 
Evidence and some theory. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 147-180. 
 
Cochrane, J., 2008. Financial markets and the real economy, in: Mehra, R. (ed.), Handbook of the 
Equity Risk Premium. North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
 
Conover, C.M., Jensen, G.R., Johnson, R.R., 1999. Monetary environments and international 
stock returns. Journal of Banking and Finance 23, 1357-1381. 
 
 29
Cook, T.Q., 1989. Determinants of the Federal funds rate: 1979-1982. Economic Review January/ 
February, 3-19. 
 
Daniel, K.D., Titman, S., 1997. Evidence on the characteristics of cross-sectional variation in 
stock returns. Journal of Finance 52, 1-33. 
 
De Bondt, W.F.M., Thaler, R., 1985. Does the stock market overreact?. Journal of Finance 40, 
793–805. 
 
Ehrmann, M., Fratzscher, M., 2004. Taking stock: monetary policy transmission to equity 
markets. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 36, 719-737. 
 
Fama, E.F., French, K.R., 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal 
of Financial Economics 33, 3-56. 
 
Fama, E.F., French, K.R., 1995. Size and book-to-market factors in earnings and returns. Journal 
of Finance 50, 131-155. 
 
Fama, E.F., French, K.R. 1996. Multifactor explanations of asset pricing anomalies. Journal of 
Finance 51, 55-84. 
 
Fazzari, S.R., Hubbard, G., Petersen, B., 1988. Financing constraints and corporate investment, 
Brooking Papers in Economic Activity 1, 141-195. 
 
Gertler, M., Gilchrist, S., 1994. Monetary policy, business cycles, and the behavior of small 
manufacturing firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 309-340. 
 
Gertler, M., Hubbard, R.G., Kashyap, A.K., 1991. Interest rate spreads, credit constraints, and 
investment fluctuations: An empirical investigation, in: Hubbard, R.G. (ed.), Financial Markets 
and Financial Crises. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. 
 
Goodfriend, M., King, R.G., 2005. The incredible Volcker disinflation. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 52, 981-1015. 
 
Greenspan, A., 2007. The age of turbulence: Adventures in a new world, Penguin Press. 
 
Guidolin, M., Timmerman, A., 2008. Size and value anomalies under regime shifts. Journal of 
Financial Econometrics 6, 1-48. 
 
Guo, H., 2004. Stock prices, firm size, and changes in the federal funds rate target. Quarterly 
Review of Economics and Finance 44, 487-507. 
 
Hahn, T., O’ Neill, M., Reyes, M.G., 2004. Anomalies: Is it the economy?. Journal of Financial 
Research 27, 273-287. 
 
Hahn, J., Lee, H., 2006. Yield spreads as alternative risk factors for size and book-to-market. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41, 245-269. 
 
 30
Horowitz, J., Loughran, T., Savin, N., 2000. Three analyses of the firm size premium. Journal of 
Empirical Finance 7, 143-153. 
 
Jegadeesh, N., Titman., S., 1993. Returns to buying winners and selling losers: Implications for 
stock market efficiency. Journal of Finance 48, 65–91. 
 
Jegadeesh, N., Titman, S., 2005. Momentum: A review, in: Thaler, R. (Ed.), Advances in 
Behavioral Finance II. Princeton Press, NJ. 
 
Jensen, G.R., Johnson, R., 1995. Discount rate changes and security returns in the US, 1962-1991. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 19, 79-95. 
 
Jensen, G.R., Johnson, R., Mercer, J.M., 1997. New Evidence on size and price-to-book effects in 
stock returns. Financial Analysts Journal 53, 34-42.   
 
Jensen, G.R., Mercer, J.M., 2002. Monetary policy and the cross-section of expected stock 
returns. Journal of Financial Research 25, 125–139. 
 
Kashyap, A.K., Lamont, O.A., Stein, J.C., 1994. Credit conditions and the cyclical behavior of 
inventories. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 565–592. 
 
Kuttner, K.N., 2001. Monetary policy surprises and interest rates: Evidence from the Fed funds 
futures market. Journal of Monetary Economics 47, 523-544. 
 
Kurov, A., 2009. Investor sentiment and the stock market’s reaction to monetary policy. Journal 
of Banking and Finance, forthcoming. 
 
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1994. Contrarian investment, extrapolation and risk. 
Journal of Finance 49, 1541-1578. 
 
Laopodis, N.T., 2006. Dynamic interactions among the stock market, Federal funds rate, inflation, 
and economic activity. The Financial Review 41, 513-545. 
 
Laopodis, N.T., 2010. Monetary policy and stock market dynamics across monetary regimes. 
FMA Hamburg conference proceedings. 
 
Lettau, M., Ludvigson S., Wachter, J., 2007. The declining equity premium: what role does the 
macroeconomic risk play?. Review of Financial Studies 21, 1653-1687. 
 
Lobo, B.J., 2002. Interest rate surprises and stock prices. The Financial Review 37, 73-92. 
 
Lutkepohl, H., 1991. Introduction to multiple time series. Springer, New York, NY. 
 
Maio, P., Tavares, J., 2007. Monetary policy and the cross-section of equity returns: Small versus 
Large and Value versus Growth. SSRN working paper.  
 
Mojon, B., 2008. When did unsystematic monetary policy have an effect on inflation?. European 
Economic Review 52, 487-497. 
 
 31
Park, K., Ratti, R.A., 2000. Real activity, inflation, stock returns, and monetary policy, The 
Financial Review 35, 59–77. 
 
Patelis, A.D., 1997. Stock return predictability and the role of monetary policy. Journal of Finance 
52, 1951–1972. 
 
Perez-Quiros, G., Timmermann, A., 2000. Firm size and cyclical variations in stock returns. 
Journal of Finance 55, 1229–1262. 
 
Pesaran, M.H., Shin, Y., 1998. Generalised impulse response analysis in linear multivariate 
models. Economics Letters 58, 17-29. 
 
Petkova, R., 2006. Do the Fama-French factors proxy for innovations in predictive variables?. 
Journal of Finance 61, 581-612. 
 
Schwert, G.W., 2003. Anomalies and market efficiency, in: Constantinides, G., Harris, M. and 
Stulz, R. (Eds.), Handbook of the economics of finance. North Holland, Amsterdam. 
 
Shiller, R., 1981. Do stock prices move too much to be justified by subsequent changes in 
dividends?. American Economic Review 71, 421-436. 
 
Shleifer, A., 2000. Inefficient markets: An introduction to behavioral finance. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, UK. 
 
Sims, C.A., 1980. Macroeconomics and reality. Econometrica 48, 1-48. 
 
Smirlock, M., Yawitz, J., 1985. Asset returns, discount rate changes and market efficiency. 
Journal of Finance 40, 1141-1158. 
 
Stock, J.H., Watson, M.W., 1989. New indexes of coincident and leading economic indicators, in: 
Blanchard, O.J., Fisher, S. (Eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1989. MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA. 
 
Strongin, S., 1995. The identification of monetary policy disturbances: Explaining the liquidity 
puzzle. Journal of Monetary Economics 35, 463-497. 
 
Thorbecke, W., 1997. On stock market returns and monetary policy. Journal of Finance 52, 635-
654. 
 
Tobin, J., 1969. A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory. Journal of Money, Credit, 
and Banking 1, 15–29. 
 
Vassalou, M., 2003. News related to future GDP growth as a risk factor in equity returns. Journal 
of Financial Economics 68, 47–73. 
 
Walsh, C.E., 2003. Monetary theory and policy, 2nd edition, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Zhang, L., 2005. The value premium. Journal of Finance 60, 67-103. 
 
 32
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for macroeconomic variables 
 
 ipn inf gcom dfed strongin 
Mean 0.2094 0.3782 0.2257 -0.0002 -0.00004 
Median 0.2427 0.3116 0.2325 0.0008 0.0085 
Maximum 2.2611 1.7761 15.1420 0.2550 0.0589 
Minimum -3.6218 -0.5352 -11.0082 -0.5525 -0.4300 
Standard Deviation 0.6979 0.3075 3.0679 0.0506 0.0439 
 
Notes: This Table shows the descriptive statistics for the macroeconomic variables that we employ in the VAR 
model. ipnt = 100*Δlog(indt) is the growth rate of industrial production (ind); inft =100*Δlog(cpit) is the growth rate 
of consumer prices index (cpi) that is, the inflation rate; gcomt =100*Δlog(comt) is the growth rate of a commodity 
price index (com); dfedt =Δ(fedt) is the change in the Federal funds rate (fed), which itself is expressed in monthly 
percentage terms; strongint is the portion of non-borrowed reserves which is orthogonal to total reserves. The 
frequency of the variables in our dataset is monthly, while the sample period extends from January 1967 to December 
2007. The source for the macroeconomic variables is IMF-International Financial Statistics. 
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Table 2 
Generalized impulse responses of value, size and past performance sorted portfolios’ 
returns to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate 
 
 Low Decile Portfolio High Decile Portfolio 
Sorting criterion for 
portfolios Impulse Response 
Average Returns 
(p.a.) Impulse Response 
Average Returns 
(p.a.) 
Book-to-market value 
ratio 
-0.51 ** 
(0.24) 10.01% 
-0.86 ** 
(0.24) 16.73% 
Cash flow-to-price 
ratio 
-0.46 * 
(0.25) 10.18% 
-0.73 ** 
(0.23) 16.09% 
Earnings-to-price 
ratio 
-0.48 * 
(0.26) 10.16% 
-0.86 ** 
(0.23) 16.73% 
Dividend-to-price 
ratio 
-0.51 ** 
(0.25) 11.39% 
-0.77 ** 
(0.17) 13.09% 
Market capitalization 
(size) 
-0.66 ** 
(0.28) 14.85% 
-0.56 ** 
(0.19) 10.87% 
Returns during 
months t-60 to t-13  
-0.80 ** 
(0.29) 16.26% 
-0.66 ** 
(0.27) 11.17% 
Returns during 
months t-12 to t-2 
-0.71 ** 
(0.34) 1.48% 
-0.59 ** 
(0.28) 19.50% 
Returns at month t-1 -0.81 ** 
(0.32) 12.91% 
-0.57 ** 
(0.25) 8.52% 
 
Notes: This Table shows the generalized impulse responses of low and high decile stock portfolios’ nominal value-
weighted returns to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate. The sorting criteria for stock 
portfolios at time t are value proxies (book-to-market value ratio, cash flow-to-price ratio, earnings-to-price ratio and 
dividend-to-price ratio), market capitalization (size) and past performance at three horizons, i.e. returns from month t-
60 to month t-13, returns from month t-12 to month t-2 and returns at month t-1. The generalized impulse responses 
are calculated following the methodology of Pesaran and Shin (1998). The endogenous variables vector is 
'[ , , , , , ]t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin r=y  where ipnt = 100*Δlog(indt) is the growth rate of industrial 
production (ind); inft =100*Δlog(cpit) is the growth rate of consumer prices index (cpi) that is, the inflation rate; 
gcomt =100*Δlog(comt) is the growth rate of a commodity price index (com); dfedt =Δ(fedt) is the change in the 
federal funds rate (fed); strongint is the portion of non-borrowed reserves which is orthogonal to total reserves; rjt is 
the return on stock portfolio j. The lag order of the estimated Vector Autoregression is determined using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). The frequency of the variables in our dataset is monthly, while the sample period 
extends from Jauary 1967 to December 2007. The source for the macroeconomic variables is IMF-International 
Financial Statistics while the source for stock portfolios’ returns is Kenneth French’s online data library. This table 
also shows the average annualized nominal returns of the corresponding portfolios. Analytic (asymptotic) standard 
errors for the impulse responses are shown in parentheses. (*) stands for statistical significance at 10% level, while 
(**) stands for statistical significance at 5% level. 
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Table 3 
Generalized impulse responses of double-sorted, size and value Fama-French portfolios’ 
returns to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate 
 
 Smallest market value (size) quintile Highest market value (size) quintile 
 Impulse Response 
Average Returns 
(p.a.) Impulse Response 
Average Returns 
(p.a.) 
Lowest book-to-market 
value ratio quintile 
-0.65 * 
(0.36) 8.12% 
-0.49 ** 
(0.22) 10.72% 
Highest book-to-market 
value ratio quintile 
-0.84 ** 
(0.25) 19.44% 
-0.72 ** 
(0.21) 13.43% 
 
Notes: This Table shows the generalized impulse responses of the extreme (i.e. combinations of lowest and highest) 
quintiles of double-sorted, size and value Fama-French stock portfolios’ nominal returns to one-standard deviation 
shock to the change in the Federal funds rate. The generalized impulse responses are calculated following the 
methodology of Pesaran and Shin (1998). The endogenous variables vector is 
'[ , , , , , ]t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin r=y  where ipnt = 100*Δlog(indt) is the growth rate of industrial 
production (ind); inft =100*Δlog(cpit) is the growth rate of consumer prices index (cpi) that is, the inflation rate; 
gcomt =100*Δlog(comt) is the growth rate of a commodity price index (com); dfedt =Δ(fedt) is the change in the 
federal funds rate (fed); strongint is the portion of non-borrowed reserves which is orthogonal to total reserves; rjt is 
the return on stock portfolio j. The lag order of the estimated Vector Autoregression is determined using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). The frequency of the variables in our dataset is monthly, while the sample period 
extends from Jauary 1967 to December 2007. The source for the macroeconomic variables is IMF-International 
Financial Statistics while the source for  the double-sorted, size and value stock portfolios’ returns is Kenneth 
French’s online data library. This table also shows the average annualized nominal returns of the corresponding 
portfolios. Analytic (asymptotic) standard errors for the impulse responses are shown in parentheses. (*) stands for 
statistical significance at 10% level, while (**) stands for statistical significance at 5% level. 
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Table 4 
Generalized impulse responses to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal 
funds rate using real returns  
 
 Low Decile Portfolio High Decile Portfolio 
Sorting criterion for 
portfolios Impulse Response 
Average Returns 
(p.a.) Impulse Response 
Average Returns 
(p.a.) 
Book-to-market value 
ratio 
-0.52 ** 
(0.24) 5.52% 
-0.87 ** 
(0.24) 12.23% 
Cash flow-to-price 
ratio 
-0.47 * 
(0.26) 5.69% 
-0.74 ** 
(0.23) 11.59% 
Earnings-to-price 
ratio 
-0.49 * 
(0.26) 5.68% 
-0.88 ** 
(0.23) 12.22% 
Dividend-to-price 
ratio 
-0.52 ** 
(0.26)  6.86% 
-0.78 ** 
(0.18) 8.56% 
Market capitalization 
(size) 
-0.67 ** 
(0.28) 10.30% 
-0.57 ** 
(0.19) 6.36% 
Returns during 
months t-60 to t-13  
-0.81 ** 
(0.29) 11.73% 
-0.67 ** 
(0.27) 6.65% 
Returns during 
months t-12 to t-2 
-0.72 ** 
(0.34) -3.12% 
-0.60 ** 
(0.28) 14.97% 
Returns at month t-1 -0.82 ** 
(0.32) 8.37% 
-0.58 ** 
(0.25) 3.98% 
 
Notes: This Table shows the generalized impulse responses of low and high decile stock portfolios’ real value-
weighted returns to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate. The sorting criteria for stock 
portfolios at time t are value proxies (book-to-market value ratio, cash flow-to-price ratio, earnings-to-price ratio and 
dividend-to-price ratio), market capitalization (size) and past performance at three horizons, i.e. returns from month t-
60 to month t-13, returns from month t-12 to month t-2 and returns at month t-1. The generalized impulse responses 
are calculated following the methodology of Pesaran and Shin (1998). The endogenous variables vector is 
'[ , , , , , ]t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin r=y  where ipnt = 100*Δlog(indt) is the growth rate of industrial 
production (ind); inft =100*Δlog(cpit) is the growth rate of consumer prices index (cpi) that is, the inflation rate; 
gcomt =100*Δlog(comt) is the growth rate of a commodity price index (com); dfedt =Δ(fedt) is the change in the 
federal funds rate (fed); strongint is the portion of non-borrowed reserves which is orthogonal to total reserves; rjt is 
the return on stock portfolio j. The lag order of the estimated Vector Autoregression is determined using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). The frequency of the variables in our dataset is monthly, while the sample period 
extends from Jauary 1967 to December 2007. The source for the macroeconomic variables is IMF-International 
Financial Statistics while the source for stock portfolios’ returns is Kenneth French’s online data library. Real returns 
are calculated deducting the inflation rate implied by CPI from nominal returns. This Table also shows the average 
annualized real returns of the corresponding portfolios. Analytic (asymptotic) standard errors for the impulse 
responses are shown in parentheses. (*) stands for statistical significance at 10% level, while (**) stands for statistical 
significance at 5% level. 
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Table 5 
Impulse responses of value, size and past performance sorted portfolios’ returns to one-
standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate using Cholesky 
decomposition 
 
 Low Decile Portfolio High Decile Portfolio 
Sorting criterion for 
portfolios Impulse Response 
Average Returns 
(p.a.) Impulse Response 
Average Returns 
(p.a.) 
Book-to-market value 
ratio 
-0.45 * 
(0.23) 10.01% 
-0.87 ** 
(0.23) 16.73% 
Cash flow-to-price 
ratio 
-0.39 
(0.25) 10.18% 
-0.74 ** 
(0.22) 16.09% 
Earnings-to-price 
ratio 
-0.43 * 
(0.26) 10.16% 
-0.86 ** 
(0.23) 16.73% 
Dividend-to-price 
ratio 
-0.44  * 
(0.25) 11.39% 
-0.77 ** 
(0.18) 13.09% 
Market capitalization 
(size) 
-0.64 ** 
(0.28) 14.85% 
-0.53 ** 
(0.19) 10.87% 
Returns during 
months t-60 to t-13  
-0.73 ** 
(0.29) 16.26% 
-0.57 ** 
(0.27) 11.17% 
Returns during 
months t-12 to t-2 
-0.70 ** 
(0.33) 1.48% 
-0.51 * 
(0.28) 19.50% 
Returns at month t-1 -0.79 ** 
(0.31) 12.91% 
-0.56 ** 
(0.25) 8.52% 
 
Notes: This Table shows the impulse responses of low and high decile stock portfolios’ nominal value-weighted 
returns to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate. The sorting criteria for stock 
portfolios at time t are value proxies (book-to-market value ratio, cash flow-to-price ratio, earnings-to-price ratio and 
dividend-to-price ratio), market capitalization (size) and past performance at three horizons, i.e. returns from month t-
60 to month t-13, returns from month t-12 to month t-2 and returns at month t-1. Impulse responses have been 
calculated by means of Cholesky decomposition. The endogenous variables vector is 
'[ , , , , , ]t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin r=y  where ipnt = 100*Δlog(indt) is the growth rate of industrial 
production (ind); inft =100*Δlog(cpit) is the growth rate of consumer prices index (cpi) that is, the inflation rate; 
gcomt =100*Δlog(comt) is the growth rate of a commodity price index (com); dfedt =Δ(fedt) is the change in the 
federal funds rate (fed); strongint is the portion of non-borrowed reserves which is orthogonal to total reserves; rjt is 
the return on stock portfolio j. The lag order of the estimated Vector Autoregression is determined using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). The frequency of the variables in our dataset is monthly, while the sample period 
extends from Jauary 1967 to December 2007. The source for the macroeconomic variables is IMF-International 
Financial Statistics while the source for stock portfolios’ returns is Kenneth French’s online data library. This Table 
also shows the average annualized returns of the corresponding portfolios. Analytic (asymptotic) standard errors for 
the impulse responses are shown in parentheses. (*) stands for statistical significance at 10% level, while (**) stands 
for statistical significance at 5% level. 
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Table 6 
Generalized impulse responses to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal 
funds rate using the sequential Likelihood Ratio test to determine the VAR order  
 
 Low Decile Portfolio High Decile Portfolio 
Sorting criterion for 
portfolios Impulse Response 
Average Returns 
(p.a.) Impulse Response 
Average Returns 
(p.a.) 
Book-to-market value 
ratio 
-0.41 * 
(0.24) 10.01% 
-0.77 ** 
(0.24) 16.73% 
Cash flow-to-price 
ratio 
-0.43 * 
(0.26) 10.18% 
-0.66 ** 
(0.23) 16.09% 
Earnings-to-price 
ratio 
-0.45 * 
(0.26) 10.16% 
-0.70 ** 
(0.23) 16.73% 
Dividend-to-price 
ratio 
-0.37  
(0.26) 11.39% 
-0.67 ** 
(0.18) 13.09% 
Market capitalization 
(size) 
-0.58 ** 
(0.28) 14.85% 
-0.51 ** 
(0.20) 10.87% 
Returns during 
months t-60 to t-13  
-0.54 * 
(0.29) 16.26% 
-0.60 ** 
(0.28) 11.17% 
Returns during 
months t-12 to t-2 
-0.69 ** 
(0.34) 1.48% 
-0.36 
(0.29) 19.50% 
Returns at month t-1 -0.89 ** 
(0.32) 12.91% 
-0.46 * 
(0.25) 8.52% 
 
Notes: This Table shows the impulse responses of low and high decile stock portfolios’ nominal value-weighted 
returns to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate. The sorting criteria for stock 
portfolios at time t are value proxies (book-to-market value ratio, cash flow-to-price ratio, earnings-to-price ratio and 
dividend-to-price ratio), market capitalization (size) and past performance at three horizons, i.e. returns from month t-
60 to month t-13, returns from month t-12 to month t-2 and returns at month t-1. The endogenous variables vector is 
'[ , , , , , ]t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin r=y  where ipnt = 100*Δlog(indt) is the growth rate of industrial 
production (ind); inft =100*Δlog(cpit) is the growth rate of consumer prices index (cpi) that is, the inflation rate; 
gcomt =100*Δlog(comt) is the growth rate of a commodity price index (com); dfedt =Δ(fedt) is the change in the 
federal funds rate (fed); strongint is the portion of non-borrowed reserves which is orthogonal to total reserves; rjt is 
the return on stock portfolio j. The lag order of the estimated Vector Autoregression was determined using the 
sequential Likelihood Ratio test of Lutkepohl (1991). The frequency of the variables in our dataset is monthly, while 
the sample period extends from Jauary 1967 to December 2007. The source for the macroeconomic variables is IMF-
International Financial Statistics while the source for stock portfolios’ returns is Kenneth French’s online data library. 
This Table also shows the average annualized nominal returns of the corresponding portfolios. Analytic (asymptotic) 
standard errors for the impulse responses are shown in parentheses. (*) stands for statistical significance at 10% level, 
while (**) stands for statistical significance at 5% level. 
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Table 7 
Generalized impulse responses of stock portfolios’ returns to one-standard deviation shock  
to the change in the Federal funds rate under alternative VAR specifications 
 
 Impulse Response of Low Decile Portfolio Impulse Response of High Decile Portfolio 
Sorting criterion for portfolios CASE I CASE II CASE III CASE IV CASE I CASE II CASE III CASE IV 
Book-to-market value ratio -0.50 ** 
(0.23) 
-0.47 ** 
(0.23) 
-0.50 ** 
(0.23) 
-0.48 * 
(0.25) 
-0.86 ** 
(0.24) 
-0.83 ** 
(0.24) 
-0.82 ** 
(0.24) 
-0.82 ** 
(0.25) 
Cash flow-to-price ratio -0.45 * 
(0.25) 
-0.44 * 
(0.25) 
-0.47 * 
(0.25) 
-0.44  
(0.27) 
-0.76 ** 
(0.22) 
-0.68 ** 
(0.22) 
-0.68 ** 
(0.22) 
-0.74 ** 
(0.24) 
Earnings-to-price ratio -0.48 * 
(0.26) 
-0.44 * 
(0.26) 
-0.48 * 
(0.26) 
-0.46 * 
(0.28) 
-0.87 ** 
(0.23) 
-0.87 ** 
(0.23) 
-0.88 ** 
(0.23) 
-0.84 ** 
(0.25) 
Dividend-to-price ratio -0.53 ** 
(0.25) 
-0.48 * 
(0.25) 
-0.50 ** 
(0.25) 
-0.48 * 
(0.27) 
-0.78 ** 
(0.18) 
-0.79 ** 
(0.18) 
-0.78 ** 
(0.18) 
-0.70 ** 
(0.19) 
Market capitalization (size) -0.71 ** 
(0.28) 
-0.70 ** 
(0.28) 
-0.72 ** 
(0.28) 
-0.63 ** 
(0.29) 
-0.51 ** 
(0.19) 
-0.54 ** 
(0.19) 
-0.57 ** 
(0.19) 
-0.50 ** 
(0.21) 
Returns during months t-60 to t-13  -0.84 ** 
(0.29) 
-0.80 ** 
(0.29) 
-0.78 ** 
(0.29) 
-0.77 ** 
(0.31) 
-0.65 **  
(0.27) 
-0.65 ** 
(0.27) 
-0.69 ** 
(0.27) 
-0.65 ** 
(0.29) 
Returns during months t-12 to t-2 -0.73 ** 
(0.34) 
-0.72 ** 
(0.34) 
-0.75 ** 
(0.34) 
-0.60 * 
(0.36) 
-0.60 ** 
(0.28) 
-0.58** 
(0.28) 
-0.60 ** 
(0.28) 
-0.63 ** 
(0.30) 
Returns at month t-1 -0.81 ** 
(0.32) 
-0.83 ** 
(0.31) 
-0.82 ** 
(0.32) 
-0.73 ** 
(0.34) 
-0.58 ** 
(0.25) 
-0.56 ** 
(0.25) 
-0.60 ** 
(0.25) 
-0.55 ** 
(0.27) 
 
Notes: This Table shows the generalized impulse responses of low and high decile stock portfolios’ nominal value-weighted returns to one-standard deviation shock to the 
change in the Federal funds rate. The sorting criteria for stock portfolios at time t are value proxies (book-to-market value ratio, cash flow-to-price ratio, earnings-to-price 
ratio and dividend-to-price ratio), market capitalization (size) and past performance at three horizons, i.e. returns from month t-60 to month t-13, returns from month t-12 
to month t-2 and returns at month t-1. The generalized impulse responses are calculated following the methodology of Pesaran and Shin (1998) for 4 different augmented 
VAR specifications. Case I refers to the structure '[ , , , , , , ]t t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin xmark r=y  where xmarkt  stands for the excess market returns. Case II 
refers to the structure '[ , , , , , , , , ]t t t t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin xmark smb hml r=y  where smbt and hmlt stand for the Fama-French Size and Value factors 
correspondingly. Case III refers to the structure '[ , , , , , , , , , ]t t t t t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin xmark smb hml mom r=y  where momt stands for the Momentum 
factor. Finally, Case IV refers to the structure '[ , , , , , , , , ]t t t t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin xmark roa inv r=y  where roat and invt stand for the Return-on-Assets 
and Investment factors of Chen et al. (2010). The lag order of the estimated Vector Autoregression is determined using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The 
sample period extends from January 1967 to December 2007, with the exception of Case IV, where the sample period starts from January 1972. The source for the 
macroeconomic variables is IMF-International Financial Statistics, the source for stock portfolios’ returns, excess market, Size, Value and Momentum factor returns is 
Kenneth French’s online data library, while the Return-on-Assets and Investment factor returns are from Lu Zhang’s online data library. Analytic (asymptotic) standard 
errors for the impulse responses are shown in parentheses. (*) stands for statistical significance at 10% level, while (**) stands for statistical significance at 5% level. 
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Table 8 
Generalized impulse responses of double-sorted, size and value Fama-French portfolios’ returns to  
one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate under alternative VAR specifications 
 
 Smallest market value (size) quintile Highest market value (size) quintile 
 CASE I CASE II CASE III CASE IV CASE I CASE II CASE III CASE IV 
Lowest book-to-market 
value ratio quintile 
-0.67 * 
(0.37) 
-0.69 * 
(0.36) 
-0.69 * 
(0.36) 
-0.58  
(0.39) 
-0.44 ** 
(0.22) 
-0.45 ** 
(0.21) 
-0.48 ** 
(0.22) 
-0.43 * 
(0.23) 
Highest book-to-market 
value ratio quintile 
-0.87 ** 
(0.25) 
-0.88 ** 
(0.25) 
-0.87 ** 
(0.26) 
-0.82 ** 
(0.27) 
-0.74 ** 
(0.21) 
-0.73 ** 
(0.21) 
-0.73 ** 
(0.21) 
-0.71 ** 
(0.23) 
 
Notes: This Table shows the generalized impulse responses of the extreme (i.e. combinations of lowest and highest) quintiles of double-sorted, size and value Fama-
French stock portfolios’ nominal returns to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate. The generalized impulse responses are calculated 
following the methodology of Pesaran and Shin (1998) for 4 different augmented VAR specifications. Case I refers to the structure 
'[ , , , , , , ]t t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin xmark r=y  where xmarkt stands for the excess market returns. Case II refers to the structure 
'[ , , , , , , , , ]t t t t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin xmark smb hml r=y  where smbt and hmlt stand for the Fama-French Size and Value factors correspondingly. Case III 
refers to the structure '[ , , , , , , , , , ]t t t t t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin xmark smb hml mom r=y  where momt stands for the Momentum factor. Finally, Case IV 
refers to the structure '[ , , , , , , , , ]t t t t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin xmark roa inv r=y  where roat and invt stand for the Return-on-Assets and Investment factors of 
Chen et al. (2010). The lag order of the estimated Vector Autoregression is determined using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The sample period extends from 
January 1967 to December 2007, with the exception of Case IV, where the sample period starts from January 1972. The source for the macroeconomic variables is IMF-
International Financial Statistics, the source for stock portfolios’ returns, excess market, Size, Value and Momentum factor returns is Kenneth French’s online data library, 
while the Return-on-Assets and Investment factor returns are from Lu Zhang’s online data library. Analytic (asymptotic) standard errors for the impulse responses are 
shown in parentheses. (*) stands for statistical significance at 10% level, while (**) stands for statistical significance at 5% level. 
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Table 9 
Subperiod generalized impulse responses of value, size and past performance sorted 
portfolios’ returns to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate 
 
Panel A: 1967.01-1982.12 
 Low Decile Portfolio High Decile Portfolio 
Sorting criterion for 
portfolios Impulse Response 
Average Returns 
(p.a.) Impulse Response 
Average Returns 
(p.a.) 
Book-to-market value 
ratio 
-0.78 * 
(0.40) 7.32% 
-1.39 ** 
(0.44) 16.40% 
Cash flow-to-price 
ratio 
-0.79 * 
(0.42) 7.40% 
-1.16 ** 
(0.40) 14.31% 
Earnings-to-price 
ratio 
-0.84 ** 
(0.42) 7.11% 
-1.34 ** 
(0.40) 15.02% 
Dividend-to-price 
ratio 
-0.88 * 
(0.45) 9.49% 
-1.29 ** 
(0.30) 10.32% 
Market capitalization 
(size) 
-1.01 ** 
(0.50) 17.52% 
-0.84 ** 
(0.31) 7.79% 
Returns during 
months t-60 to t-13  
-1.40 ** 
(0.48) 16.42% 
-1.05 ** 
(0.47) 5.69% 
Returns during 
months t-12 to t-2 
-1.22 ** 
(0.53) -0.78% 
-0.73  
(0.47) 20.55% 
Returns at month t-1 -1.34 ** 
(0.51) 15.37% 
-0.81 ** 
(0.41) 7.44% 
Panel B: 1983.01-2007.12 
 Low Decile Portfolio High Decile Portfolio 
Sorting criterion for 
portfolios Impulse Response 
Average Returns 
(p.a.) Impulse Response 
Average Returns 
(p.a.) 
Book-to-market value 
ratio 
-0.26 
(0.29) 11.81% 
-0.36 
(0.26) 17.00% 
Cash flow-to-price 
ratio 
-0.29 
(0.32) 12.04% 
-0.32 
(0.25) 17.29% 
Earnings-to-price 
ratio 
-0.27 
(0.33) 12.20% 
-0.54 * 
(0.28) 17.87% 
Dividend-to-price 
ratio 
-0.28 
(0.31) 12.62% 
-0.44 ** 
(0.22) 14.88% 
Market capitalization 
(size) 
-0.26 
(0.32) 13.13% 
-0.28 
(0.24) 12.89% 
Returns during 
months t-60 to t-13  
-0.11 
(0.35) 16.18% 
-0.40 
(0.33) 14.71% 
Returns during 
months t-12 to t-2 
-0.38 
(0.43) 2.83% 
-0.47 
(0.35) 18.84% 
Returns at month t-1 -0.32 
(0.40) 12.00% 
-0.27 
(0.31) 9.20% 
 
Notes: This Table shows the generalized impulse responses of low and high decile stock portfolios’ nominal value-
weighted returns to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate. Data details and sources, 
model specification and estimation procedure are the same as the ones outlined in Table 2. The only difference is 
that the sample period is split in two subsamples. Panel A refers to the first subperiod of the sample that extends 
from January 1967 to December 1982, while Panel B refers to the second subperiod that covers the period January 
1983 to December 2007. Analytic (asymptotic) standard errors for the impulse responses are shown in parentheses. 
(*) stands for statistical significance at 10% level, while (**) stands for statistical significance at 5% level.
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Figure 1 
Generalized impulse responses of low and high book-to-market value decile portfolios’ 
returns to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate 
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Notes: This Figure shows the generalized impulse responses (solid curves) of low (Panel A) and high (Panel B) book-to-market value decile stock 
portfolios’ nominal value-weighted returns to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate for an 8-month period. 95% 
confidence intervals, calculated from analytic (asymptotic) standard errors are also drawn (dashed curves). The generalized impulse responses are 
calculated following the methodology of Pesaran and Shin (1998). The endogenous variables vector is given by: 
'[ , , , , , ]t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin r=y . The definition of the variables and the source of the data are as in Table 2. The lag order of the 
estimated Vector Autoregression is determined using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The frequency of the variables in our dataset is 
monthly, while the sample period extends from Jauary 1967 to December 2007. 
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Figure 2 
Generalized impulse responses of small and big capitalization decile portfolios’ 
returns to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate 
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Notes: This Figure shows the generalized impulse responses (solid curves) of small (Panel A) and big (Panel B) capitalization decile stock 
portfolios’ nominal value-weighted returns to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate for an 8-month period. 95% 
confidence intervals, calculated from analytic (asymptotic) standard errors are also drawn (dashed curves). The generalized impulse responses are 
calculated following the methodology of Pesaran and Shin (1998). The endogenous variables vector is given by: 
'[ , , , , , ]t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin r=y . The definition of the variables and the source of the data are as in Table 2. The lag order of the 
estimated Vector Autoregression is determined using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The frequency of the variables in our dataset is 
monthly, while the sample period extends from Jauary 1967 to December 2007. 
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Figure 3 
Generalized impulse responses of past year losers and winners decile portfolios’ 
returns to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate 
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Notes: This Figure shows the generalized impulse responses (solid curves) of past year losers (Panel A) and winners (Panel B) decile stock 
portfolios’ nominal value-weighted returns to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate for an 8-month period. 95% 
confidence intervals, calculated from analytic (asymptotic) standard errors are also drawn (dashed curves). The generalized impulse responses are 
calculated following the methodology of Pesaran and Shin (1998). The endogenous variables vector is given by: 
'[ , , , , , ]t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin r=y . The definition of the variables and the source of the data are as in Table 2. The lag order of the 
estimated Vector Autoregression is determined using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The frequency of the variables in our dataset is 
monthly, while the sample period extends from Jauary 1967 to December 2007. 
 44
Figure 4 
Generalized impulse responses of extreme quintiles of double-sorted Fama-French portfolios’ 
returns to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate 
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Notes: This Figure shows the generalized impulse responses (solid curves) of the extreme quintiles of double-sorted Fama-French stock portfolios’ 
nominal returns to one-standard deviation shock to the change in the Federal funds rate for an 8-month period. Panel A refers to the combination 
of smallest size and lowest book-to-market value quintile portfolio, Panel B refers to the combination of the smallest size and highest book-to-
market value quintile portfolio, Panel C refers to the combination of the biggest size and lowest book-to-market value quintile portfolio, while 
Panel D refers to the biggest size and highest book-to-market value quintile portfolio. 95% confidence intervals, calculated from analytic 
(asymptotic) standard errors are also drawn (dashed curves). The generalized impulse responses are calculated following the methodology of 
Pesaran and Shin (1998). The endogenous variables vector is: '[ , , , , , ]t t t t t t jtipn inf gcom dfed strongin r=y . The definition of the variables and the 
source of the data are as in Table 2. The lag order of the estimated Vector Autoregression is determined using the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC). The frequency of the variables in our dataset is monthly, while the sample period extends from Jauary 1967 to December 2007. 
